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Abstract
This paper proposes to identify the micro-level sources for the dy-
namic increasing returns occurring at an aggregate level. The paper
reverts to a micro model of technological change in-line with the evolu-
tionary literature on industrial dynamics. The data generated through
numerical simulations are used to identify the sources of increasing re-
turns as measured by the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law. In this respect we
also aim to provide some plausible micro-foundations to this Law.
The paper shows that: (i) Dynamic increasing returns appear as an
emergent property of the model; (ii) micro-characteristics of techni-
cal change, as the amplitude and the frequency of changes, as well as
selection mechanisms significantly shape these increasing returns.
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1 Introduction
Understanding the sources of growth and long run development of economies
is an age-old issue in economics. From A. Smith’s seminal work to the latest
development in growth theory, economists widely acknowledge the key role
played by changes in production technologies as a major source of economic
growth. These technological changes are usually considered as favouring
growth by preventing decreasing returns. No real consensus can, however,
be found on the sources of these increasing returns.
Among the possible explanations to be found in the literature, division
of labour and technological innovation are the most spread. From a formal
point of view, the dominant stream of literature tends to assume the exis-
tence of increasing returns; the latter being justified by various exogenous
mechanisms. Hence, the New Growth Theory (NGT) releases the assump-
tion of an exogenous residual technical change by simply assuming increasing
(or non-decreasing) returns (see Romer, 1986; Romer, 1990). Prior to the de-
velopment of the NGT, some economists have tried to consider the sources
of these increasing returns as resulting from the economic activity itself.
Among these, Kaldor’s Cumulative Causation developed, from the mid six-
ties onwards, a Post-Keynesian approach to economic dynamics accounting
for dynamic increasing returns. Evolutionary economics constitutes a second
alternative to the NGT. Drawing on Schumpeter’s legacy, it accounts for
technical change as the trigger of economic dynamics.
For the Kaldorians, technical change is one of the key components respon-
sible for the cumulative causation underlying the growth process. Technical
change within this framework cannot be distinguished from the existence of
increasing returns. These are strongly interrelated: technical change is a
source for increasing returns on the one hand. Increasing returns are a pre-
requisite for technical change to occur on the other. For Kaldor, the sources
of increasing returns are two-fold:
First, at the firm level, increasing returns, if partly induced by large
scale manufacturing activities, in line with the Smithian concept of static
increasing returns, are mainly rooted in the renewal of production capaci-
ties through investments. These micro-level sources are captured in Kaldor
(1957)’s ‘technical progress function’:
“Hence instead of assuming that some given rate of increase in the
productivity is attributable to technical progress which is superim-
posed, so to speak, on the growth of productivity attributable to cap-
ital accumulation, we shall postulate a single relationship between the
growth of capital and the growth of productivity which incorporates
2
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the influence of both factors.[...] The shape of [the ‘technical progress
function’] reflects both the magnitude and the character of techni-
cal progress as well as the increasing in organisation, etc., difficulties
imposed by faster rates of technical change. It may be assumed that
some increases in productivity would take place even if capital per man
remained constant over time, since there are always some innovations
[...] which enable production to be increased without additional in-
vestment. But beyond these the growth in productivity will depend
on the rate of growth in the capital stock” (Kaldor (1957), as reprinted
p 265-266 in Kaldor (1960)).
Second, increasing returns are rooted into a macro-level division of labour.
The latter increases the sectoral specialisation, generates novelty and there-
fore improves the efficiency of the activity. These increasing returns are
intrinsically dynamic. Kaldor reverts, on the aspect, to Young (1928) who
attributes increasing returns to a large scale division of labour:
“In addition, as Allyn Young emphasised, increasing returns is a ‘macro-
phenomenon’-just because so much of the economies of scale emerge
as a result of increased differentiation, the emergence of new pro-
cesses and new subsidiary industries, they cannot be ‘disconnected
adequately by observing the effect of variations in the size of an indi-
vidual firm or of a particular industry’. (Kaldor (1966) p.9-10)”
Kaldor (1966) supports this two-fold explanation for the existence of in-
creasing returns by re-interpreting the empirical evidences provided by Ver-
doorn (1949):
“This [i.e. dynamic increasing returns], in my view, is the basic reason
for the empirical relationship between the growth of productivity and
the growth of production which has recently come to be known as the
‘Verdoorn Law’ [...]. It is dynamic rather than a static relationship...
primarily because technical progress enters into it, and not just a
reflection of the economies of large-scale production.” (Kaldor (1966)
p. 10)
Verdoorn’s article initially aimed to find a method to forecast changes in
labour productivity. As a matter of fact, his empirical investigations stressed
the existence of a constant relationship between growth rates of labour pro-
ductivity and of production for both the pre- and the post-World War I
periods for a selected number of countries1. Kaldor (1966) himself estimated
1Depending on the period, Verdoorn’s country sample included: Canada, Czechoslo-
vakia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland,
Switzerland, UK and USA.
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the same relationship for the period 1953-1963 using a sample of 12 coun-
tries2. Further, he estimated a relation between employment and production
growth rates3. Both the empirical relationships appeared to be significant
and robust, and became known as the Kaldor Verdoorn Law.
The simplicity of the functional form of the Law represents a simple al-
ternative to forecast productivity changes or quantify the magnitude of the
increasing returns. It prevents the “abuse” of micro-level assumptions, either
on the functional for of an aggregate production function or on the behaviour
of economic agents. This might explain the relative popularity of the law.
McCombie, Pugno, and Soro (2002) list about 80 major papers making use
of the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law since Verdoorn (1949). Most of these contribu-
tions concern applied empirical analysis, making use of the law to measure
increasing returns for specific countries, regions or sectors and/or to account
for differences among the latter.
The empirical uses of the Law are confined to the identification and quan-
tification of increasing returns. The Kaldor-Verdoorn Law in itself does not
provide any explanation on the mechanisms underlying technical change or
the existence of these increasing returns. The theoretical foundations brought
to the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law by Kaldor (1966) remained verbal. Few formal
micro-foundations of the law can be found in the literature: On the one hand,
Verdoorn (1949) shows that the relationship at the core of the Law is com-
patible with various types of aggregated production functions without really
providing micro-foundations. On the other hand, McCombie (2002) shows,
while formalising Allyn Young’s macro-level increasing returns, that under
some conditions on the parameters of the industry level production function,
a Kaldor-Verdoorn Law relationship can exists. He also argues that Romer
(1986) and Romer (1990) provide another possible theoretical explanation for
Young’s theory. It has to be noted that in this case, increasing returns are
assumed more than micro-founded. The lack of micro-foundations possibly
resides in the fact that, first, in an equilibrium framework, increasing returns
have to be assumed. Second, as stated by Kaldor (1972), dynamic increasing
returns, as measured by the Law, can only be considered out of equilibrium,
and necessary generates disequilibrium.
As argued in Llerena and Lorentz (2004a), the Schumpeterian/Evolutionary
approach to technical change, should provide a formal framework to micro-
2Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, UK and USA.
3This relation is known as the ‘Kaldor specification’ of the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law. It is
also known, for other reasons, as the ‘Fabricant Law’ (see Metcalfe, Foster, and Ramlogan,
2006)
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found the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law. Within the Evolutionary framework, and
following Schumpeter’s precepts, technical change emerges at the micro-level
and diffuses into the economy. These mechanisms are at the core of economic
dynamics. Contrary to the NGT that assumes increasing returns to generate
technical change, here, technical change generates the dynamics; increasing
returns being its emergent property.
The paper aims to show that a Kaldor-Verdoorn Law can emerge from
the dynamics generated by an Evolutionary model of technical change. In
this sense, we aim to provide a micro-level explanation for the Law comple-
mentary to the ones verbally provided by Kaldor (1966).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes
the model we use for the numerical simulations whose results are presented
and analysed in section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 An Evolutionary model of technical change
We develop here a simple model of firm level technical change in line with the
Evolutionary literature. We refer along this paper, more specifically to the
Neo-Schumpeterian branch of Evolutionary economics (see Witt, 2008). De-
veloped around the seminal work of Nelson and Winter (1982) 4, this stream
of literature proposes a formal representation of Schumpeter’s thought: Tech-
nical change, as a key factor for economic dynamics, emerges unevenly and
unpredictably from firms or entrepreneurs’ behaviour. It then diffuses across
the economy, disrupting the established economic equilibrium.
The evolutionary interpretation of Schumpeter’s analysis relies on analo-
gies with the formalisation to be found in evolutionary biology. Note that the
analogy remains quite limited here. An economic system is assumed to be
composed by one (or more) population of agents. The latter are defined by a
set of heterogeneous characteristics. The characteristics of the population(s)
are subject to mutations occurring unevenly among agents, generating and
sustaining the heterogeneity within populations. The agents composing the
population(s) are subject to selection mechanisms. The selection mechanism
defines the level of performance of the agents and there survival. In the Neo-
Schumpeterian literature, the selection mechanism is usually considered to
represent (or to be represented by) market mechanisms.
Following the traditional modelling strategies to be found in this stream
of the evolutionary literature, the model is organised as follows:
4See also Dosi, Freeman, Nelson, Silverberg, and Soete (1988), Kwasnicki (2001) and
Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) for more recent developments in this stream of literature.
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1. A population of I firms, indexed i ∈ {1; ...; I}, characterised by a ho-
mogenous product but heterogeneous production processes leading to
differences in productivity, price and profitability.
2. The selection mechanism shares the total demand among firms, favour-
ing the best performing firms. Selection acts here as a channel for the
diffusion of the most efficient technologies, ruling out the least efficient
firms from the market.
3. Firm’s production process is subject to mutation through technological
shocks linked to there R&D activity. We choose here to distinguish two
phases in this process:
(a) Exploration: Firms search for new production facilities, through
innovation or imitation of existing production facilities. The out-
come is uncertain and defines efficiency (in terms of productivity)
of the resulting vintage of capital goods.
(b) Exploitation of R&D outcome: This stage requires firms to invest
in incorporating the outcome of research in the production pro-
cess. This second stage is funded by firms’ sales, and then directly
dependent on the success of previous investments.
The firms are assumed to be bounded rational. They are not conscious
of the selection mechanisms, and do not directly respond to it but revert to
simple decision rules to set both their prices, their investment and technolog-
ical adoption strategies. The aggregated dynamics as analysed in the third
part of the paper is derived from the combination of these micro-elements.
Note that we focus here on the supply side dynamics to put in light the tech-
nological mechanisms that can lead to the emergence of a Kaldor-Verdoorn
Law. We therefore leave aside the mechanisms expanding aggregate demand,
complement of the Kaldor-Verdoorn law in generating cumulative growth.5
This section is organised as follows: We first characterise the agents com-
posing our population, then describe the selection process, and end presenting
of the mutation mechanisms.
2.1 Defining the population: Firms characteristics.
Our model is structured around a population of firms i ∈ [1; I]. In the short
run (i.e., at each time step t), a given firm i is represented by a produc-
5Models integrating such Evolutionary micro-dynamics in a complete cumulative
growth framework can be found among others in Llerena and Lorentz (2004b), Lorentz
(2006) or Lorentz (2008).
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tion function characterised by constant returns to scale. Firms’ production
process uses labour as a unique production factor. Capital enters indirectly
in the production function. The level of labour productivity depends on
the accumulation of capital vintages. Investment in the different vintages of
capital goods will increase labour productivity. The production function is
represented as follows:
Yi,t = Ai,t−1Li,t (1)
where Yi,t is the output of firm i at time t. Ai,t−1 represents labour pro-
ductivity and Li,t the labour force employed in the production process. The
output is constrained by the demand for the firms’ products. The level of
aggregate demand (Dt) is set exogenously
6 . Aggregate demand is then al-
located to each firm according to the selection process setting firms’ market
shares (zi,t). The level of production of each firm is computed as follows:
Yi,t = zi,tDt (2)
Firms set prices through a mark-up rule. This mark-up is applied to unit
production costs. Formally, the pricing rule can be represented as follows:
pi,t = (1 + µ)
w
Ai,t−1
(3)
where pi,t represents the price set by firm i at time t, µ the mark-up coefficient
and w the nominal wage set exogenously. It should be noted that we assume
here that the mark-up coefficients are fixed for each firms.
The firm’s profit level is then computed as follows:
Πi,t = pi,tYi,t − wLi,t = µ w
Ai,t−1
Yi,t (4)
In the model profits constitutes the only financial resource for firms’ invest-
ments. In other words, all the decisions taken by the firms are constrained
by their profits. Their ability to capture demand shares, due to their past
performances therefore directly affects all their investment plans.
2.2 Defining firms’ performance: The selection mech-
anisms.
The selection mechanism represents, in an evolutionary system, the core of its
dynamics. It sorts the various components of a population, creating motion
6We assume here that the aggregate demand grows at a fixed rate δ, so that:
Dt = Dt−1 (1 + δ)
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in the system, and allocating resources within the population. The selection
process is usually considered by Evolutionary economics as a metaphor for
the competition mechanisms. We choose here to use a replicator dynamics to
model the selection mechanisms 7. The replicator dynamics is usually con-
sidered as a formal representation of Fisher’s principle of natural selection.
This principle can be summarised as follows: The share of groups of individ-
uals in a population is favoured by their relative fitness level with respect to
the average. This average level depends itself on the shares of every groups,
such that the selection mechanisms tend to favour the fittest components of a
population. Formally the replicator equation defines the increase (decrease)
in the share of a group of individuals as a function of the distance between
the fitness level of the group and the average fitness level. The higher the
distance, the higher the share grows.
We use this mechanism to model the competition among firms. The
goods produced being homogeneous, the competition among firms is based
on prices. The replicator dynamics defines firms’ market shares as a function
of firms price competitiveness (Ei,t). The lower the price (pi,t), the higher
price competitiveness: Ei,t =
1
pi,t
Formally, the replicator mechanism modifies firms market shares (zi,t) as
a function of price competitiveness (Ei,t) relative to the average competitive-
ness on the market (E¯t)
8:
zi,t = zi,t−1
(
1 + φ
(
Ei,t
E¯t
− 1
))
(5)
The parameter φ measures sensitivity to changes in competitiveness. φ can
be assimilated to the price elasticity of the selection mechanism; the closer
φ to 0 the more rigid the selection with respect to price competitiveness.
Firms exit the market if their market share is below z¯. The exiting firms
are replaced by entrant firms whose characteristics are set equal to the mar-
ket averages, with an entry market share equal to z¯. This insures a constant
number of firms on the market as required by the formalisation of the repli-
cator equation above to insure market shares to sum to one and zi,t ∈ [0; 1],
7A comprehensive view on the use of the replicator dynamics in Evolutionary economics
can be found in Metcalfe (1998)
8E¯t the average competitiveness on the market, given by:
E¯t =
∑
i
zi,t−1Ei,t
8
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∀i ∈ I. Moreover, the exit of an innovator (imitator) firm is compensated by
the entry of another innovator (imitator) firm. The proportion of innovators
in the population of firms also remains constant.9
2.3 Changes in Firms characteristics: The mutation
mechanisms
The mutation mechanisms insure that the system remains in motion, coun-
terbalancing the selection mechanisms. The selection dynamics requires some
degrees of heterogeneity among the characteristics of the agents. Through
time, selection limits the level of heterogeneity in the system. The mutation
of agents’ characteristics generates and sustains some degree of heterogeneity
within the population.
In our model, mutation occurs at the level of the production processes of
the firms through changes in labour productivity. The process of technical
improvement can be divided into two distinct phases. Firms explore new
technological possibilities, through local search (innovation) or by captur-
ing external technological possibilities (imitation). This process leads to a
production design (capital vintage) that can be exploited by firms in their
production process. The second stage consists in incorporating this new
capital vintage. The exploitation process is related to investment in capital
goods and the exploration is related to investments in R&D. We assume that
a priority is given to capital investments, and therefore the exploitation of
already discovered technologies.
Labour productivity is deduced from the accumulation of capital goods
through time. Each vintage of capital embodies a level of labour productivity
(ai,t). The more a firm invests in a vintage the more its level of embodied
labour productivity affects the production process. At every time step labour
productivity can be expressed by the following equation:
Ai,t =
Ii,t∑t
τ=1 Ii,τ
ai,t−1 +
∑t−1
τ=1 Ii,τ∑t
τ=1 Ii,τ
Ai,t−1 (6)
where ai,t−1 represents the labour productivity embodied in the capital good
developed by i during period t− 1. Ii,t represents the level of investment in
capital goods of the firm.
9Note that this assumption has no qualitative effect on the results, as long as there
exist at least one innovator.
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The level of investments in capital goods (Ii,t) corresponds to a share (ιi)
of firms’ sales (Yi,t). To simplify the model, we assume ιi to be fixed. We
exclude the possibility for investments to be adapted and used as a strate-
gic variable, contrary to Silverberg and Verspagen (1994), Silverberg and
Verspagen (1998) among others10. This assumption allows us to isolate the
effect of ιi on the Kaldor–Verdoorn Law.
Investments are financed by firms’ own resources and cannot exceed the
actual sales: ιi ∈ [0; 1]. For the seek of simplicity we rule out the possibility
for firms to revert to a financial sector to finance their investments. Firms
are therefore constrained by their own profits to finance investments:
Ii,t = min {ιiYi,t ; Πi,t}
The numerical values of the parameters used in the simulations insure that
ιi < µ
w
Ai,t−1
. The actual investments are always below the profit constraint,
and can be expressed as follows11:
Ii,t = ιiYi,t (7)
The resources available for investments depend on the firms’ sales, a function
of their competitiveness and therefore depend on their previous performances.
The model does not only account for the endogenous construction of the pro-
duction capacities of firms, through the accumulation of capital. This process
is also constrained by the firms’ past performances. The model includes to its
Evolutionary micro-foundation an additional ‘Austrian’ flavour (Amendola
and Gaffard, 1998).
The level of investments in R&D corresponds to a share ρi of their sales
(Yi,t). For the seek of simplicity, this share remains fixed, and cannot exceed
firms’ own resources: ρi ∈ [0; 1]. R&D investments are constrained by the
remaining available profits (Πi,t) after capital investments (Ii,t). The R&D
investments are used to hire workers (Ri,t) assigned to the R&D activity:
Ri,t =
1
w
min{ρiYi,t; Πi,t − Ii,t} (8)
10In Llerena and Lorentz (2004a), we considered investment behaviours as driven by
adaptive decision rules. With such rules however, surviving firms tend to apply fixed
shares in the long run, while firms lagging too far behind do no manage to compensate
their gap adapting their behaviour. The priority given to investments in capital then
prevents any R&D investment.
11Investments are growing at the same rate as firms’ output. The dynamics for capital
accumulation follows then exactly the growth of output at the firm level.
10
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We assume here that firms resources are either invested in capital or in R&D,
so that ρi = 1− ιi.
In direct line with Nelson and Winter (1982), we consider the outcome
of the R&D activity as uncertain: First, the probability of success of R&D
is an increasing function of the R&D intensity of the firm, as measured by
Ri,t
Yi,t
. Second, if successful, the characteristics of the newly developed capi-
tal vintage is stochastic, resulting from either a process of ‘local search’ or
imitation, depending on the nature of the firm.
The R&D process, followed by each firms, is represented by the algorithm
that follows:
1. A first random draw decides of the success (or failure) of the R&D
activity at time t. The probability of success of the R&D process
increases with the number of workers hired for the research activity.
This probability is null if the ratio is null and tends to one if the firm
uses all its resources to hire R&D workers.
2. If R&D is successful, the prototype of a new capital vintage is devel-
oped. The new vintage at t is characterised by an embodied level of
labour productivity (ai,t):
ai,t = ai,t−1 + max {i,t; 0} (9)
i,c,t ∼ N(0;σi,t) (10)
The value of the standard deviation σi,t depends on the nature of the
firm: If the firm is an innovator, σi,t is fixed; if the firm is an imitator,
σi,t is a function of firm’s technological gap:
σi,t =

σ if the firm is an innovator
max{χ(a¯t − ai,t); 0} if the firm is an imitator
(11)
where a¯t represents the average level of embodied productivity.
12
In the case of innovators, the formalisation of R&D can be assimilate to
Nelson and Winter (1982) concept of ‘local search’, as the stochastic process is
centred on the previous level of productivity, and the potential improvements
12It is formally computed as:
a¯t =
∑
i
zi,tai,t−1
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limited. For imitators, the R&D activity consists in filling the gap with the
industry’s average technological level.13.
3 Simulation Results
Our aim with this paper is two fold: While accounting for the contribution
of the micro-level mechanisms underlying the emergence and diffusion of
technical change on dynamic increasing returns at the aggregate level, we
propose an alternative micro-foundation to the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law in line
with the Schumpeterian tradition.
In the above presented model, firms experience constant returns to scale
in the short run. Moreover, firms, on average, experience no changes in their
production capacities. Hence, if they appear, increasing returns are dynamic
and result from the evolutionary micro-dynamics.
To bring this result into light, we decompose the micro-dynamics into
three main phases:
1. The emergence of technological shocks. This phase corresponds to the
arrival of new capital vintages. It occurs at the level of the innovative
firms as an outcome the R&D process.
2. The adoption of the technological shocks. This phase corresponds to
the introduction of the new capital vintages in the production process.
3. The diffusion of the shocks among the population. The diffusion phase
occurs through two channels: First through imitation; second through
the selection process that allocates more resources to the fittest firms.
The presentation and analysis of the simulation results is organised as
follows: Section 3.1 presents the parameter values used and reports prelimi-
nary results on the effect of the various parameter settings on the productivity
dynamics. Section 3.2 presents the results of the estimation of the Kaldor-
Verdoorn Law using the data generated by the numerical simulations.
3.1 Parameterisation and Preliminary Analysis
The three phases described above are directly affected by the following set of
parameters. The simulations are then conducted in order to stress the effect
13In Llerena and Lorentz (2004a), firms that can switch from imitative to innovative
strategies (and reversely) depending on their technological gap. Fixing the R&D strategies
of the firms, as in this paper, does not affect qualitatively the results of the simulations.
On the other hand, this allows us to isolate the effect of the diffusion of technologies
through imitation from the diffusion within the population through selection.
12
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of these parameters.
ιi is defined in the previous section as the share of firms’ resources de-
voted to investments in capital goods. This parameter controls the speed
of adoption of the technological shock, generated by the R&D activity and
embodied into the capital vintages. Moreover, we assume through the simu-
lations procedure that ρi, the share of resources devoted to finance the R&D
activity, is set equal to (1− ιi). ιi also controls the frequency of technological
changes, affecting directly the probability of success of R&D.
The parameter is set so that: ιi ∈ [0; 1]. As ιi tends to 1, the allocation of
resources by firms favours the adoption of existing technologies. As ιi tends
to 0, the allocation of resources favours the development of new technologies.
Note that for extreme values (ιi = 0; 1), no productivity gains are possible:
On the one hand, if all the resources are devoted to the adoption of existing
technologies, this prevents to finance the R&D necessary for further advances
in production technologies. On the other, if ιi = 0, all the resources are used
to develop capital vintages that are never adopted by the firm.
σ corresponds to the standard deviation of the stochastic process defining
the outcome of the R&D process for the innovator. This parameter controls
the amplitude of the technological shocks resulting from the R&D activity
of the firms. As σ increases, the potential jump in embodied productivity
increases. Simultaneously, as only the positive jumps are adopted by firms,
increasing σ also increases the unevenness of the technological shocks. This
parameter therefore affects both the amplitude of technical changes at the
firm level and the degree of heterogeneity among firms.
χ measures the appropriability of technological spillovers by imitators.
This parameter controls the diffusion of technological shocks resulting from
innovative firms to the imitative firms. The larger χ ∈ [0; 1], the higher the
spillovers, the faster the imitators reduce their technological gap.
φ defines the sensitiveness of the replicator dynamics. This parameter di-
rectly controls the strength of selection. Through market selection, the avail-
able resources (aggregate demand) is allocated to firms. These resources are
then used to develop and adopt production technologies. Increasing φ, first,
increases the uneven distribution of resources resulting from the productivity
differences among firms. Second, it reinforces the uneven technological en-
dowments of firms favouring the access to resources for the high productivity
firms. Finally, φ controls the diffusion of the best technologies within the
economy.
13
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δ constrains the rate of growth of aggregate demand, constraining directly
the level of the resources available for firms. As we focus, in this paper, on the
technological mechanisms underlying the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law, we choose
to assume a fixed rate of growth. δ therefore controls the overall amount
of resources to be distributed to firms. For a given distribution of resources
among firms, and a given allocation of resources between capital and R&D
investments within firms, increasing δ should accelerate the adoption of tech-
nologies by firms.
The parameter also allows us to control the total level of output in our
population of firms. This appear useful to avoid any problem of endogeneity
in the explanatory variable while estimating the coefficients of the Kaldor-
Verdoorn Law in the second part of the analysis.
The first two parameters, ιi and σ, allow us to identify the effect linked
to both the emergence and the adoption of technological shocks at the firm
level. The parameters φ and χ allow to isolate the effect of the phase of
diffusion of these shocks among the population and to the economy as a
whole. The parameter δ should theoretically amplify these mechanisms. The
detailed parameter values used for the simulations are reported in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
The numerical simulations are conducted as follows: Every simulation
run lasts 500 time steps. This is largely sufficient for the dynamics generated
by the model to stabilise. No more significant changes in the dynamics are
observed beyond 500 periods.
Each parameter settings are replicated 50 times. The analysis relies on
the average values over 50 replications. By doing so we insure the robustness
of the results we present.
We consider for each simulation a population of 20 firms. One half of
the firms behave as innovators, the second half as imitators. This repartition
remains fixed along the simulations. The size of the population is sufficient to
reach significant and robust results and insure reasonable computation times.
A larger population of firms would not qualitatively modify the results.
Finally, we apply the same values for the initial conditions to all firms
for all simulation runs. Heterogeneity among firms emerges only from the
dynamics described by the model. The differences in the results presented
for the various settings are only due to the specific parameters under inves-
tigation.
14
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Some preliminary simulation analysis focuses on the effect of the various
parameters controlling for the three phases of technical changes on produc-
tivity dynamics. We choose to measure productivity growth rates over the
50, 100 and 250 first simulation steps.
We first consider the join effect of parameters ι and σ. These param-
eters allow to control both the allocation of resources between capital and
R&D investments and the standard deviation in productivity gains generated
through R&D.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figures 1 and 2 present the effect on aggregate productivity growth rates
of variations in the values of ι and σ, over selected time periods. Simulations
show that both parameters have a clear effect on productivity dynamics:
Higher values of ι tend to decrease productivity growth, while increasing
σ increases productivity growth. On the one hand, the more resources are
devoted to R&D, the higher productivity growth. This effect is amplified as
σ increases. On the other hand, the higher the amplitude of technical change,
the higher productivity growth. This effect is amplified for low values of ι (see
figure 1). Similar patterns emerge for the various time periods considered.
However, the amplitude of these effects seems to gradually vanish as time
goes (see Figures 2).
The probability of success of R&D being directly correlated with the
share of resources devoted to R&D, the lower ι, the higher the probability
of occurrence of technical change. More frequent novel capital goods arising
hence favours productivity growth. However, if ι is too low (ι = 0), firms
don’t invest in capital to exploit these changes. Favouring, the emergence
phase increases productivity growth but requires a minimum resources to be
devoted to the adoption to be effective.
The parameter σ controls the potential productivity jumps between two
capital vintages. Increasing the amplitude of the shock then mechanically
favours the productivity growth rate. This effect is reinforced as the fre-
quency of the shocks is increased with higher shares of resources devoted to
R&D.
These two parameters affect directly the phase of emergence and adoption
of the technological change. The higher the frequency of the technological
shocks, the higher the productivity growth. Second, the higher the amplitude
of the technological change induced by these shocks, the higher productiv-
ity growth rates. On the one hand, the more firms favour the emergence of
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new capital vintages, the higher the aggregate productivity growth. On the
other, adoption constrains the actual effect of technical change on produc-
tivity growth. If no resources are devoted to the adoption of these vintages,
the effect of technical change on productivity disappears.
The second set of simulations focuses on the effect of changes in χ and φ
on the productivity dynamics. The parameter χ controls the level of spillover
to be absorbed by the imitating firms. The higher χ, the larger the absorp-
tion of spillover by the firms, the more these firms reduce their productivity
gap. This parameter favours the diffusion of the shocks through imitation.
The parameter φ controls the sensitiveness of the selection process. It me-
chanically affects the aggregated productivity dynamics: A stronger selection
mechanism favours the most competitive firms that faster gain market shares.
These firms benefited from better technological shocks. The higher φ, the
faster the technological shocks diffuses among the system.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 3 presents the outcome of the changes in these parameter on the
productivity growth rates over 50 simulation steps. In this case, strengthen-
ing the selection mechanism clearly affects the productivity dynamics. This
result can be explained by the mechanisms described above. The higher
φ, the stronger the selection mechanisms and the faster the diffusion of the
technological shocks. Increasing χ, on the other hand, only slightly increases
productivity. This effect even vanishes when considering productivity growth
over 100 steps (Figure 4a). Figure 4b presents the productivity growth rates
over 250 simulation steps. The results previously found have disappeared,
except for very loose selection pressures. In the latter case, firms have time
to imitate explaining the productivity growth picks for the high values of χ.
The influence of the strength of the selection mechanism is only transi-
tory. This is due to the nature of the selection mechanisms. The replicator
dynamics necessarily leads the system to a quasi-monopoly situation. The
aggregate dynamics is only due to the productivity changes of the monopo-
listic firm, and the underlying Schumpeterian micro-dynamics stabilise. The
factors favouring diffusion are then marginal. This result is directly linked
to some assumptions made to keep the model simple: Including changes in
technological trajectories or large scale division of labour, should prevent the
Schumpeterian dynamics to stabilise.
We can briefly summarise the results found as follows:
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- Factors favouring the emergence of technical shocks at the firm level
seem to prevail all the other mechanisms.
- As selection mechanisms go all the effects tend to gradually disappear;
technical change becoming less likely.
- In all cases, the effect of these parameters on productivity dynamics
vanishes through time .
We might then infer that if increasing returns are to be found, these might
be limited in time, and mainly influenced by the frequency and the amplitude
of firm level shocks.
3.2 The Kaldor-Verdoorn Law as an emergent prop-
erty
The second part of the simulation analysis aims to show that a Kaldor-
Verdoorn Law can emerge from the dynamics generated by a simple Evolu-
tionary model. We estimate the Verdoorn specification of the Law as follows:
At − A0
A0
= α + λ
Yt − Y0
Y0
At is the aggregate level of productivity as generated by the simulations, and
Yt measures the aggregate output. This equation is then estimated using the
data generated by the simulation model.
The data set is built as follows: The aggregate output is defined by
aggregate demand. Aggregate demand grows at an exogenous growth rate.
We use exactly the same values of this growth rates for all the parameter
settings. The data set for aggregate productivity is generated by the various
replications of the simulation for different values of the parameters.
We estimate the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law for the various specifications of the
parameters. We then analyse the effect of the changes in the values of these
parameters on the estimated value of the Verdoorn coefficient, its significance
level, and on the explanatory power of the estimates. The significance level is
measured using Student t, and the explanatory power of the estimates using
the corrected R2.
We focus here on the estimates realised for the 50 steps growth rates.
In all cases, estimates of the Verdoorn coefficient are significant (except for
extreme values of the parameters). In other words a Kaldor-Verdoorn Law
emerges regardless the parameter settings. In this respect our micro-founded
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model is able to generate significant dynamic increasing returns as an emer-
gent property of the micro-dynamics. In this sense the model provides an
alternative micro-foundations to the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law.
Note that as expected, the law disappears for larger time-span: it appears
less frequently for the 100 step growth rates and do not appear for the 250
step growth rates. Technical change occurring more unevenly in these case,
one cannot expect significant dynamic increasing returns to occur.
The first set of estimates focuses on the parameters controlling the emer-
gence of the technological shocks. The results of these estimates are presented
in Figures 5 to 7.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 presents the estimated values of the Verdoorn coefficient for
different settings of ι and σ. These parameters respectively influence the
frequency and the amplitude of technological shocks. As seen in the previous
sub-section, these parameters directly affect productivity dynamics. They
should therefore positively affect the level of the increasing returns. This is
confirmed by the estimated values of the Verdoorn coefficient. First, increas-
ing the value of σ significantly increases the value of the coefficient. Second,
increasing the values ι reduces the value of the coefficient. The parame-
ters favouring the emergence of the shock positively affect the level of the
increasing returns.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 6 presents both the standard deviation and the value of Student t
statistics for the estimated coefficients. We focus on this statistic to measure
the effect of the changes in the parameters on the significance level of the
estimated coefficient. This figure clearly shows a decrease in the Student’s t
when increasing both ι and σ. This decrease is such that for high values of
σ only few of the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero.
Hence, if an increase in the amplitude of the technological shocks increases
the value of the Verdoorn coefficient, it tends to be less significant. This
tendency is also confirmed by the Figure 7 that presents the corrected R2 of
the estimations. Increases in σ also correspond to drastic decreases in this
statistic. In other words, increasing the amplitude of technological changes
increases the degree of increasing returns but these are less and less significant
and show lower explanatory power. This result is due to the stochastic nature
of the technological change: Increasing σ enlarges the potential productivity
gains at the cost of more uneven gains. These increases in the variability of
the technological shocks explains the loss in terms of significance.
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[Figure 7 about here.]
Result 1 The higher the amplitude of innovation (σ), the higher the Ver-
doorn coefficient, therefore, the higher the increasing returns. Simultaneously
the estimated coefficients loose of their significance and the Law its explana-
tory power. The higher the investments in R&D (lower ι), the higher increas-
ing returns. Higher investments in R&D levels preserves the significance of
the Law for high values of σ.
The second set of estimations concerns the parameters affecting the dif-
fusion of the technological shocks on the system. We focus the analysis on
the effect of changes in the strength of the selection mechanisms (φ) and
the appropriability of the spillovers (χ) on the estimated value of the Ver-
doorn coefficient. Figures 8 to 10 respectively present the estimated value of
the Verdoorn coefficient, its Student t statistic and the corrected R2 for the
various specifications of the two parameters.
[Figure 8 about here.]
The previous section highlighted the significant but transitory effect of
strengthening the selection mechanisms on productivity dynamics. As shown
by Figure 8, increasing the sensitiveness of the selection process has a positive
effect on the estimated values of the coefficient of the Law.
[Figure 9 about here.]
[Figure 10 about here.]
A strong selection process mechanically increases the aggregate produc-
tivity dynamics, giving more weight to the most dynamic firms. This effect
is then disclosed, through the estimates of the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law, into a
higher the level of increasing returns. A more striking results also comes out
from the estimations of the Law: Changes in the parameter χ positively and
significantly affect the estimated value of the coefficient. Hence, favouring
imitation favours increasing returns.
Figure 9 presents the value of the Student t statistics for the estimated
Verdoorn coefficients. These measure the level of significance of the coeffi-
cient. Except for the highest values of φ, all the estimated coefficient are
significantly higher then zero. Note, however, that the value of the statistic
decreases as χ increases. A stronger selection mechanism limits the number of
firms able to generate technical change. The aggregate productivity growth
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is then more sensitive to the uneven nature of the shock. The outcome of
the estimations is then less significant.
Figure 10, presenting the values of the corrected R2, corroborates this
result. As the selection mechanism gets stronger, the value of this statistic
decreases. The Law therefore looses its explanatory power. The changes in
the parameter χ slightly positively affect the two statistics. More generally
the effect of these parameters on both the estimates of λ and the statistics
considered remains limited. The range of the changes evolved is largely less
significant than for the first set of parameters.
Result 2 Enforcing the selection mechanisms significantly affects the Kaldor-
Verdoorn Law. It favours, as imitation mechanisms, the diffusion of techno-
logical shocks this increase the value of the estimated coefficient. A stronger
selection mechanisms limits the number of active firms. This limits the fre-
quency of the technical change and therefore reduces the significance and
explanatory power of the Law.
The estimations realised over this artificial data-set lead to the following
results (as summarised in table 2): On the one hand, the frequency and the
persistence of technological shocks favours both value and significance of the
dynamic increasing returns, strengthening the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law. On
the other hand, the factors favouring the amplitude and the diffusion of the
shocks positively affect the level of increasing returns, although to the detri-
ment of the significance of the coefficient, weakening the Kaldor-Verdoorn
Law.
[Table 2 about here.]
In other words, dynamic increasing returns require frequent technical
shocks to occur. The more frequent these shock the higher the returns.
However, the amplitude of these shocks might prevent these returns to be
significant. Too large productivity jumps at the firm levels are detrimental for
the aggregate level increasing returns. Similarly when market pressures are
too important. These results seem in line with recent empirical estimations
of the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law (see among others Knell, 2004; Lorentz, 2005):
Sectors experiencing higher (and/or significant) dynamic increasing returns
are mainly activities (both in manufacturing and services) characterised by
established technologies and/or constant technical improvements. For sec-
tors experiencing important technical changes or technological breakthrough
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(as ICTs related industries and services or aircraft and space craft industries
in Lorentz (2005)), the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law is more rarely observed.
These results somehow relativise the predominant role of technological
breakthrough as explaining economic growth as usually put forward in the
Schumpeterian literature. More frequent incremental improvements along
a given technological trajectory seem more favourable to increasing returns
then a rugged technological trajectory. These breakthrough remain impor-
tant in favouring the emergence of new trajectories which cannot be ac-
counted for in our model.
These results also show that capital accumulation cannot in itself account
for the existence of increasing returns. The accumulation of capital affects
increasing returns only as a mean of transportation for novelty. This brings
us back to the very essence of the “technical progress function” as put forward
by Kaldor (1957).
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a simple micro-founded model of technological change
inspired by the evolutionary literature. We have aimed to identify some
sources of dynamic increasing returns. In this respect, we analyse the effects
of changes in various micro-characteristics of the model on the productiv-
ity dynamics. This analysis highlights the importance of the frequency and
amplitude of the technological shocks in shaping the aggregate productivity
dynamics. Second, the simulation exhibits that the resources devoted to the
adoption of these shocks only transitorily affect these dynamics. Similarly,
the factors favouring the diffusion of these shocks, and particularly, the se-
lection mechanism, have a significant but transitory effect on productivity
dynamics.
We then estimate the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law using the data generated
by the simulations for the various specifications of the parameters. The
Law is verified in most of the cases. Moreover the estimation showed that
some of the micro-characteristics affect the value and significance level of
the Verdoorn coefficient. On the one hand, increasing the amplitude of the
shocks and the strength of the selection mechanisms increases the values
but decreases the significance of the coefficient. These losses in significance
are respectively due to increase in the unevenness of the shocks, in the first
case, and a reduction of the frequency of the shocks, in the second one.
On the other hand, augmenting the resources devoted to R&D increases the
frequency of the shocks, affecting positively the value and significance of
the shocks. The results from these estimations therefore show the limited
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impact breakthrough technical change can possibly have on the aggregate
productivity dynamics.
We showed through the paper that Schumpeterian micro-dynamics con-
stitutes an alternative explanation for the emergence of a Kaldor-Verdoorn
Law. The various components of these micro-dynamics have a rather com-
plex effect on the Law: Reinforcing the increasing returns and in some cases,
simultaneously limiting their significance due to higher unevenness in techno-
logical changes. These results, however, are only transitory: As the Schum-
peterian dynamics stabilises, the Law is no longer observable. This can be
explained by some of the assumptions made designing the model: Technolog-
ical changes are only ‘local’; there is no changes of trajectory or emergence
of new paradigms that would prevent the stabilisation of the Schumpeterian
dynamics. Further, the model does not account for large scale division of
labour, either through the emergence of new sectors or the externalisation
of parts of firms activities. Such types of considerations require to rethink
the formalisation of the production process beyond what the Evolutionary
literature proposes. This clearly opens the door for future developments of
the present work.
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Figure 1: Labour productivity growth rates (50 steps), ι vs. σ
(a) Productivity growth rates (100 steps) (b) Productivity growth rates (250 steps)
Figure 2: Labour productivity growth rates, ι vs. σ
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Figure 3: Labour productivity growth rates (50 steps), φ vs. χ
(a) Productivity growth rates (100 steps) (b) Productivity growth rates (250 steps)
Figure 4: Labour productivity growth rates, φ vs. χ
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Figure 5: Estimated Verdoorn coefficient (ι vs. σ)
(a) Standard deviation (b) Student’s t
Figure 6: Statistics for the Verdoorn coefficient, ι vs. σ
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Figure 7: Corrected R2 for the estimated Kaldor-Verdoorn Law (ι vs. σ)
Figure 8: Estimated Verdoorn coefficient (φ vs. χ)
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(a) Standard deviation (b) Student’s t
Figure 9: Statistics for the Verdoorn coefficient, φ vs. χ
Figure 10: Corrected R2 for the estimated Kaldor-Verdoorn Law (φ vs. χ)
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Table 1: Parameters settings (default values in bold)
ιi 0 0,02 0,04 0,06 0,08 0,1 0,12 0,14 0,16 0,18
0,2 0,22 0,24 0,26 0,28 0,30 0,32 0,34 0,36 0,38
0,40 0,50 0,60 0,70 0,80 0,90 1,00 - - -
σ 0,01 0,015 0,02 0,025 0,03 0,035 0,04 0,045 0,05 0,06
0.07 0,08 0,09 0,1 - - - - - -
δ 0,001 0,002 0,003 0,004 0,005 0,006 0,007 0,008 0,009 0,01
0,011 0,012 0,013 0,0,14 0,015 0,016 0,017 0,018 0,019 0,02
0,021 0,22 0,023 0,024 0,025 0,026 0,027 0,028 0,029 0,03
0,031 0,032 0,033 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.04
0.041 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.05
φ 0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1 1,25 - - - -
χ 0 0,25 0,5 0,75 1 - - - - -
µ 1 - - - - - - - - -
w 10 - - - - - - - - -
z¯ 0,0001 - - - - - - - - -
D0 10 - - - - - - - - -
zi,0 0,05 - - - - - - - - -
Ai,0 1 - - - - - - - - -
ai,0 1 - - - - - - - - -
Table 2: Main Simulation Results
↗ ι ↗ σ ↗ φ ↗ χ
Verdoorn coefficient − + + +
Standard deviation − + + +
Student t − − − +
Corrected R2 − − − +
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